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ABSTRACT
The research begins with a brief overview of the personal income 
taxation trends in developed and transition countries in the past thirty 
years. During this period, we determine that in developed countries 
there has been a shift from equity towards efficiency principle conducted 
by a reduction of top progressive personal income tax (hereafter: PIT) 
rates and through base broadening. For selected transition countries, we 
develop a theoretical benchmark model under flat tax and compare it in 
practice in order to measure efficiency in terms of tax neutrality. We find 
very few characteristics of theoretical flat tax applied in practice causing 
inefficiency. We also analyse the progressivity indicators as an equity 
enhancing measure under flat tax. Progressivity indicators are very 
low and are a result of the flat PIT and flat social security contributions 
(hereafter: SSCs). Finally, for the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), 
efficiency and progressivity measures can be enhanced indicating that 
PIT reforms should be brought together with SSCs reforms.
Keywords:	 income,	flat	tax,	transition,	progressivity	indicator
JEL: H20, J31
1 Introduction
In personal income tax (hereafter PIT) systems in developed and transition 
countries, theoretical discussions evolve around efficiency-equity trade-off 
of such system. So, the main hypothesis is that efficiency principle in PIT is 
given priority over equity principle in developed and transition countries. In 
order to evaluate this hypothesis, it is important to firstly define income as 
a tax base and then look at the PIT rates. Income as a tax base can be either 
comprehensive defined under Schanz-Haig-Simons (hereafter: S-H-S) or 
an expenditure or consumption based tax base. Secondly, PIT rates can be 
progressive or proportional and are respectively linked to the definition of 
the PIT tax base.
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After a brief theoretical discussion regarding definition of the tax base and 
the flat tax, we focus on efficiency measures of the flat tax. We develop a 
theoretical benchmark model and compare three (former) transition countries 
to this model: Estonia, which has applied the flat tax since 1994 and has since 
decreased the flat tax rate from 26% to current 20%, Slovakia which switched 
from progressive to flat with 19% rate and in 2013 back to progressive PIT 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter B&H), namely Federation of B&H 
(hereafter: FB&H), that has applied the flat tax since 2009 at the rate of 10%. 
We conclude that none of the selected countries (in 2008 or 2009 in FB&H) 
has applied the flat tax fully in practice and that most differences exist in the 
definition of the tax base.
Also, we calculate progressivity indicator for each of three selected countries 
in 2011 as an equity aspect of PIT under flat tax. Due to lack of structural 
reforms in PIT and SSCs in FB&H, we conclude that there is no progressivity 
in the FB&H case unlike in two selected transition countries. Progressivity 
and hence equity aspects of PIT are highly affected by the social security 
contributions (hereafter SSCs), so PIT reforms in (F)B&H should be brought 
together with SSCs reforms.
2 Income as a Tax Base and Personal Income Tax – Theoretical 
Analysis and Recent Trends
In the discussion of income as a tax base and personal income tax, we need 
to distinguish two different concepts as basis for the analysis: the definition 
of the tax base and the definition of tax rates. These two concepts are very 
much interlinked and we attempt to distinguish between the two. So, in the 
definition of tax base, two popular discussions are known in the history of 
economic thought: comprehensive S-H-S definition of income as a tax base, 
and an expenditure or consumption based tax base. Regarding tax rates, 
PIT rates are nowadays either proportional (or flat, with or without personal 
allowance) or progressive.
The “right mix” of tax base and tax rates is very important in each tax system. 
Discussions regarding this topic are very old and can be found in the works 
of classical economists (Musgrave, 1998). However, external factors also 
affect PIT base and rates. In the past century, with the outbreak of intensified 
industrialisation, discussion regarding comprehensiveness of income as a tax 
base has been enhanced in developed countries. Popular discussions regarding 
definition of income as a tax base can be found in the works of German 
authors1 (e.g. Andel, 1993), as well as Anglo-Saxon authors (e.g. Seligman, 
1914; Musgrave, 1998). In these discussions, we can clearly determine 
differences in ideological roots between German (continental) and Anglo-
Saxon organisation of the fiscal system which is reflected in their PIT and SSCs 
1 For a discussion regarding broader versus narrower definition of income, see e.g., Blažić 
(2006).
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system (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, with the outbreak of neoliberal 
economic thought induced by globalisation, some new (old) issues regarding 
comprehensiveness of income as a tax base began to be re-examined. The 
1980s marked the new era in terms of discussion of comprehensiveness 
of the tax base (Pechman, 1980; Pechman, 1984) and popular discussions 
regarding income versus consumption as a tax base. Discussions regarding 
rates (progressive or proportional PIT) followed suit.
In theory, the most comprehensive and broadest definition of income is 
the S-H-S definition of income since it best accords with economic ability 
to pay (Goode, 1964). Nowadays, empirical discussion of S-H-S definition of 
income has its numerous limitations from theory to practice. These mainly 
relate to the tax treatment of saving, realised (and unrealised) capital gains, 
property, rent, wealth, etc. Thus, comprehensive S-H-S definition of income is 
considered to accord with progressive PIT rates and is mostly as such applied 
in developed countries.
A major difference between income and consumption as a tax base is defined 
through (economic) double taxation of saving. Under S-H-S definition, income 
includes both consumption and saving, which are then taxed. Therefore, S-H-S 
definition of income taxes all income, i.e. regardless of its source, which means 
that income as a return on saving is also taxed. This problem could be solved 
by either deducting saving from the tax base prior to taxation, or by excluding 
the return on saving from the tax base (since income was previously taxed). 
Saving is not taxed under consumption tax. So, the majority of differences 
between S-H-S definition of income and an expenditure tax arise from these 
differences in treatment of various sources of saving. This issue was identified 
very early (i.e., Pigou, 1928 in Musgrave, 1998). Nowadays, transition countries 
that apply proportional or flat tax rate are considered to apply a version of an 
expenditure tax since income from saving is mostly left untaxed.
Since 1980s, developed countries have been flattening the progressive PIT 
rates and base-broadening the tax base. Base broadening measures relate 
to the treatment of different sources of saving and are (theoretically and 
empirically) discussed in Blažić (2006; 2009) for both developed and transition 
countries. Within the sources of saving, taxation of dividends is of special 
interest. A comparative analysis of dividend taxation in Croatia and Slovenia 
shows regressivity of differential treatment of dividend taxation (Blažić & 
Bašagić, 2005).
Recent microsimulation empirical testing undertaken in most developed 
countries and transition countries that apply progressive PIT indicate that 
a switch from progressive PIT to flat tax would bring more inequality into 
income distribution, but would enhance efficiency in terms of its positive 
effects on income/capital/wealth accumulation, and increased efficiency of 
labour (for example, Teather, 2005 (UK); Peichl, 2008 (Germany); Gonzalez 
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& Pijoan-Mas, 2005 (Spain); Jacobs, deMooij, & Kees, 2007 (Netherlands); 
Paulus & Peichl, 2008 (EU); Čok, 2004 (Slovenia); Urban, 2010 (Croatia).
So, developed countries have not applied the flat tax, but have undertaken 
measures that flatten the progressive PIT and broaden the tax base, which 
enhances efficiency at the expense of growing inequality (Stiglitz, 2013; 
Piketty, 2014). These measures also provided an opportunity for capital 
accretion which does not necessarily come from income, but capital and 
business income which is a result of “financialisation” (OECD, 2014a) and 
deregulation of the financial sector(s) worldwide. Additionally, the number 
and size of PIT rates have decreased, although developed countries have 
maintained progressive PIT (OECD, 2014a), i.e., the overall progressivity 
decreased giving opportunity for an income/capital/wealth accumulation 
(Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2009; Davies, Sandström, Shorrocks, & Wolff, 2011; 
Matthews, 2011; Piketty & Zucman, 2013).
As a result of such trends and decisions, the PIT tax share (i.e. PIT revenues 
to total revenues, Cnossen & Bird, 1990) in OECD countries has declined by 
significant five per cent since early 1980s (OECD, 2013). In the same period, 
the share of value added tax (VAT) increased by about ten per cent (OECD, 
2013). This clear shift from direct to indirect taxes has per se caused greater 
overall inequality bearing in mind regressive effects of indirect taxes. Both 
OECD and the European Commission (OECD, 2010; Garnier et al., 2013) are 
still supporting further PIT tax rate cuts and base broadening measures as a 
reduction of high labour tax wedge in OECD/EU countries2. These measures 
favour the efficiency principle over equity, and cause greater inequality. 
Lately, global financial crisis in 2008 has led to an increase in top PIT rates as a 
response to growing inequality in developed countries as well as the need for 
financing budget deficits (EUROSTAT, 2013).
In transition countries, these patterns are more difficult to clearly disentangle 
and evaluate. This is mainly due to the dominant transition process, especially 
in the first four to six years of transition – the transition shock (Onaran, 
2011). As a result of the shock, growing inequality is inevitable in these years 
(Rutkowski, 1996) and it is not caused by either progressive or flat tax. Thus, 
since developed countries are aiming at enhancing the efficiency over equity 
principle, transition countries should follow suit since they are aiming to 
reach the (tax-related) goals of developed countries and become developed 
countries. Also, efficiency could be enhanced by improving efficiency of the 
public (tax) administration and further reduction of bureaucracy especially in 
South-East European states (Aristovnik & Obadić, 2015), but this is beyond 
the topic of this paper.
2 The European Commission suggests to the EU Member States that they should flatten 
progressive PIT, in terms of “shifting taxation away from labour, broadening tax bases, 
reducing corporate tax debt bias and improving tax compliance...“ (Garnier et al., 2013, p. 1).
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As an efficiency-enhancing measure, most transition countries have applied 
the flat tax since it enhances the efficiency aspect at the expense of equity. 
For those applying progressive PIT, flattening of PIT and base-broadening 
also occurred (for example in Slovenia, see Klun, 2006). The satisfaction of 
the efficiency principle is even more important than the satisfaction of the 
equity principle in transition countries since they “crave” for income and 
capital accumulation.
2.1 The Flat Tax Model – Income or Consumption-Based PIT?
The idea of flat tax was proposed in the USA in the 1980s by Hall and 
Rabushka. USA did not apply it, but with the fall of the Iron Curtain, the 
former Eastern bloc countries began to apply it. Transition countries that 
are nowadays considered flat tax countries apply a different model from the 
theoretical one – the Hall and Rabushka flat tax. This model defines the tax 
base as consumption-based. Saving under such a model is left untaxed, which 
provides an opportunity for income/capital/wealth accumulation. Since the 
theoretical model is defined together with corporate income tax (CIT), we will 
only analyse its PIT component. Simply said, PIT under flat tax is considered 
as a single rate above a certain threshold (basic/personal allowance) with a 
very few (non) standard deductions or exclusions. The system is indirectly 
progressive. SSCs are not considered under flat tax but pension incomes 
when received (and belonging to SSCs) are considered to be taxed.
In the transition process, transition countries aim at becoming developed 
countries with similar tax systems. So, in developed countries, PIT systems 
are organised under progressive PIT with mostly comprehensive (close 
to S-H-S) definition of income. Suggestions and recommendations to the 
transition countries from the international community (i.e. IMF and the World 
Bank) indicate that transition countries should apply simple and broad-based 
progressive PIT with PIT rates not exceeding 40% (Stotsky, 1995). However, 
this is not the case in most transition countries, especially in the Western 
Balkan countries3. Hence, transition countries that apply the flat tax define 
tax base closer to S-H-S definition of income, which includes all income from 
different sources with many (non) standard deductions and exclusions, and 
have low flat tax rates (currently up to 20%).
2.2 Personal Income Tax in Transition Countries under Flat Tax – 
Departures from the Theoretical Model
For selected transition countries (i.e. two countries and one B&H entity – 
FB&H) that apply the flat tax, we have developed a theoretical benchmark 
model for the flat tax and compared it empirically for years of 2008 and 2009. 
Table 1 defines theoretical benchmark model as a combination of Cnossen and 
Messere (1990) definition of the tax base since it best satisfies the principle 
3 Western Balkans countries mostly apply the flat tax with very low PIT rates (except Croatia 
and, most recently, Albania).
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of efficiency in terms of tax neutrality. The model includes a few modifications. 
The modifications relate to a combination of five important empirical 
departures from definition of income as a tax base (Cnossen & Messere, 1990) 
in terms of standard and non-standard allowances and other loopholes defined 
by Hall and Rabushka (2007, p. 49). There are five areas considered which 
are grouped into three important aspects: treatment of fringe benefits and 
standard and non-standard deductions, SSCs which include welfare benefits 
and retirement, and insurance schemes and treatment of capital gains. Hall 
and Rabushka’s (2007) theoretical model does not recognise SSCs, but they 
should be included in this analysis (due to treatment of pension incomes). So, 
a clear definition of income as a tax base with a few deductions and exclusions 
under flat tax is considered to be more efficient than progressive PIT with 
numerous deductions and exclusions. In table 1 we have also assumed that 
income was defined in terms of gross wages and salaries since in the selected 
transition countries they take more than 90 per cent of all reported income. 
Within standard deductions (exclusions), personal and family allowances 
were considered together with a group of other non-standard deductions 
which are eliminated in Hall and Rabushka’s (2007) model, but are discussed 
in the model of Cnossen and Messere (1990). It is evident that all selected 
countries recognise standard allowances (i.e., personal characteristics of the 
taxpayer), but not non-standard allowances, where most differences from 
theoretical to empirical model occur. Hall and Rabushka (2007) define tax 
unit and recognise joint taxation in the theoretical model. In practice this is 
not the case in Slovakia and FB&H. Similarly, fringe benefits only include hot 
meal allowance, transport allowance and holiday pay allowance and are not 
taxed in Slovakia and FB&H. Theoretical model promotes taxation of pensions 
when they are received, no taxation of dividends, equalising rate of PIT and 
corporate income tax (CIT), and single tax slip. The most significant difference 
from theoretical model in practice is in the tax treatment of pensions and 
inclusion of SSCs into taxable base. Bear in mind that, unlike in the FB&H case, 
Estonia and Slovakia have gone through a comprehensive pension reform, 
but again excluded pensions (coming from the Ist and IInd pillar) from PIT 
taxation.
From table 1 we can also see that selected transition countries still have room 
for improvements in terms of enhancing efficiency of PIT especially in terms of 
removal of deductions and exclusions. Equity aspects should be partly satisfied 
through social policy (i.e. SSCs4) although there is a growing inequality in all 
selected countries (EUROSTAT, 2014). Results from table 1 should also show 
a case of hybrid income tax, a combination of S-H-S comprehensive definition 
of income, and consumption-based-flat tax definition. With a clear departure 
from the theoretical flat tax model in terms of definition of the tax base, the 
analysis of (a number of) tax rates comes second.
4 As early as in the 1990s, Cnossen and Messere (1990) anticipated that SSCs will be considered 
as a redistributive tool of the tax policy rather than progressive PIT.
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Table 1:  Main differences between theoretical and practical flat tax in 2008 
and 2009 in Estonia, Slovakia, and FB&H5
Category of PIT Theoretical flat tax
Estonian 
case
Slovakian 
case FB&H case
Earnings – wages, salaries are taxed Yes Yes Yes Yes
Annual personal allowance Yes Yes Yes Yes
Annual family allowance Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marital status and number of 
dependents considered/Joint taxation Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/No
Taxable fringe benefits Yes Yes No No
Other non-standard deductions:
Mortgage interest payments No Yes N/A Yes
Educational expenses No Yes N/A N/A
Specific health expenses No N/A N/A Yes
Pensions (the Ist and IInd pillar) taxed 
when received Yes No No N/A(No)
SSCs included in the tax base No/N/A Yes Yes Yes
Dividends taxed No No* No No
PIT and CIT rate equal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Single tax slip Yes No No Yes
* For a specific treatment of dividends and its link to CIT in Estonia, see Trasberg (2011).
Source: Kesti (2008); FB&H (2009). Own interpretation.
3 Personal Income Taxation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
3.1 Constitutional Structure of B&H
As a former Yugoslav Republic, B&H gained its independence in March of 
1992 through a referendum. However, due to a devastating war in B&H 
(from 1992 to 1995), B&H entered transition as late as in 1996. B&H’s current 
fiscal structure is determined by the B&H Constitution, i.e. the Dayton Peace 
Agreement6. Bearing in mind that B&H’s GDP7 fell by 80 per cent in 1992, 
B&H’s pre-war macroeconomic performance was/is difficult to reach. Hence, 
the expected fall in GDP per capita, rise in inflation and unemployment, which 
was expected in all transition countries at the beginning of the transition 
process, in B&H occurred under the worst possible circumstances (except 
the rise in inflation). Due to significant human, capital and infrastructural 
losses, up until 2000, B&H’s economy heavily depended on international aid 
i.e. B&H was an aid-driven economy. Since 2000, B&H should have finished its 
reconstruction process and should have progressed in the transition process. 
However, this was (is) not the case, primarily due to unfinished privatisation 
(B&H Directorate for Economic Planning, 2014), lack of political will induced 
by divided markets, and weak institutional and legal system. B&H Constitution 
under Dayton Peace Agreement left the legacy of two entities organised as 
an asymmetric federation (Figure1).
5 FB&H case analyses the flat tax in 2009 and Estonian and Slovak case in 2008.
6 Formally, The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
7 There was a methodological change in the calculation of GDP after 1992 since the Yugoslav 
Statistical Office calculated GMP (Yugoslav Statistical Yearbook, 1991).
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Figure 1:  Constitutional structure of B&H
N.B. Solid line indicates direct supervision; dashed line indicates indirect supervision. FB&H stands for 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, RS stands for Republika Srpska and DB for District Brčko.
Under Article 10 of the Dayton Agreement, OHR stands for “Office of the High Representative” which 
oversees the civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Since 1999, the number of municipalities in 
FB&H and RS decreased (from 84 to 79 in FB&H and from 63 to 62 in RS).
Source: Kreso (2005, p. 256)
Under such challenging circumstances, fiscal system and tax system are 
decentralised at entities’ levels in the area of direct taxes and SSCs, and 
centralised at the level of B&H (since 2003) in the area of indirect taxes. Figure 
2 shows the current fiscal structure in B&H.
Figure 2:  Fiscal structures of B&H since 2006
N.B. Residents and employees in DB can opt in terms of SSCs payments between SSCs funds in RS and FB&H.
Source: own interpretation 
3.2 Flat Tax Reforms in FB&H and RS
Since 1995, both B&H entities in the area of PIT have been passing laws and 
made frequent changes in the past nineteen years. FB&H has since 1996 
applied ‘schedular’ wage tax at the net wage with flat rates decreasing from 
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15 per cent to 5 per cent in the period 1996–2008. Additional cantonal annual 
tax on total income (i.e. tax on high income-earning individuals) existed and 
tax rates varied at the level of ten FB&H cantons from zero to twenty per 
cent. The system was quite inefficient bearing in mind that a simple change 
of residency (which was the basis for income tax payments) would result in 
tax avoidance. In the period 2005-2008, these revenues took on average 
as little as 0.13 per cent of total revenues (Ministry of Finance FB&H, 2008, 
own calculation). In 2008, a new law was passed, and in 2009 synthetic 
PIT at a flat rate of 10 per cent above a certain threshold – basic/personal 
allowance was introduced. With the flat tax adoption, PIT system was made 
more progressive compared to the previous “schedular” system. However, 
unlike Estonian or Slovakian case, we cannot say that B&H’s entities applied a 
comprehensive tax reform due to the fact that laws were passed separately 
and inconsistently. SSCs reforms have not followed PIT reforms, so that SSCs 
rates have been decreasing, but are still very high causing a high labour tax 
wedge (higher than EU15 average, OECD, 2014b) especially in FB&H for low 
income earners (Arandarenko & Vukojevic, 2008; Kreso & Lazovic-Pita, 2011). 
Recent suggestions from international community in B&H (both entities) 
promote comprehensive reforms in the area of labour taxation, namely 
lowering the labour tax burden (Delegation of the European Union to B&H, 
2014). Additionally, reforms with the introduction of flat tax that were 
undertaken in both entities still cause efficiency distortions (Table 1); they 
were not revenue neutral, nor did they bring higher employment rates (B&H 
Directorate of Economic Planning, 2010). Note here that flat tax reforms 
were brought in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008–2009.
RS has been changing legal provisions regarding tax rates, personal allowances 
(abolishing and reintroducing) and SSCs rates almost annually (especially after 
2010). Currently, RS applies flat 10% PIT rate with basic/personal allowance 
reintroduced in 2014 and lower SSCs rates than in FB&H. The RS case was 
not analysed in Table 1 because, with the change towards flat tax, RS did 
not redefine the tax base, i.e., the law remains unclear in the definition of 
net versus gross income (wages). In fact, tax slips and the claim of personal 
allowances are quite different from the FB&H case.
The situation of “organised mess” resulting in an unfinished transition process 
(i.e., unfinished privatisation) and low political will reflects on the tax system, 
namely PIT. Successful reforms (in terms of greater fiscal discipline and higher 
tax revenues) brought in the area of indirect taxes were in fact decisions from 
the international community in B&H (OHR decisions). Long, inefficient and 
unfinished transition process (primarily privatisation) heavily affects B&H’s 
economy reflecting in low levels of efficiency, high pre-tax income inequality 
and severe poverty. All this, and high costs of entering the labour markets 
in terms of high labour tax wedge induced by predominant and high SSCs 
cause high levels of unemployment, high informal/shadow economy and 
high tax evasion due to the lack of institutional framework. In an asymmetric 
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(con)federation such as B&H, proportional (or flat tax) PIT might be a better 
option than progressive PIT (Brennan & Buchanan, 1977). 
3.3 Progressivity Indicators in FB&H and Comparison to Estonia 
and Slovakia
Using OECD methodology (Paturot, Mellbye, & Brys, 2013, p. 8), we will 
prove the lack of actual income tax reforms in FB&H. Even with the flat tax 
introduction, it will be shown that progressivity as an equity indicator is very 
low in FB&H. For OECD countries, 2011 was the year when the average PIT 
rate progression indicator was calculated using the following formula:
τ = AETRX2%AW − AETRX1%AW(X2%AW − X1%AW)  (1) 
Average effective tax rate (AETRX2%AW; AETRX1%AW) in the numerator 
represents the average effective tax rates corresponding to two different 
income levels X1 and X2, respectively. The income levels are expressed 
as multiples of the average wage (AW) and are all in accordance with the 
methodology given in Paturot et al. (2013). Thus, AW and the corresponding 
measures of labour tax burden including PIT and SSCs paid by employee 
and employer are calculated in accordance with OECD methodology (OECD, 
2014b). Additionally, average annual gross wage earnings required for the 
calculation of progressivity indicators are calculated for an average worker 
earning income in all economic activities under ISIC rev 3.1. The average PIT 
rate progression indicator “measures how the average PIT rate increases per 
percentage point increase in income, measured as a multiple of the AW, over 
the X2%AW – X1%AW income range” (Paturot et al., 2013, p. 9).
There is also another progressivity indicator (Paturot et al., 2013) and it 
relates to average tax wedge progression indicator. Since this progressivity 
indicator follows the trend of the average PIT rate progression indicator for 
the group of OECD countries for various tax units (for example, single or 
married taxpayer with or without children), it will not be separately analysed.
In FB&H, there were no legal changes, either in the tax base (excluding the 
effects of inflation), or in the PIT and SSC rates, so average PIT rate progression 
indicator was the same in 2011 as in 2009 – the year of flat tax introduction. 
The RS case will not be analysed due to unclear definition of the tax base 
in both periods and frequent legal changes. For FB&H, we will use OECD 
methodology for a single earner without children at five intervals depending 
on the size of the average (gross) wage (AW). The five intervals are defined in 
the range from 50% of AW to 200% of AW (Paturot et al., 2013, p. 9). OECD 
(2014b) broadens the analysis to 500% of the AW. 
In the case of FB&H in 2009 and 2011, only 3.1% and 3.6% respectively of the 
total employed earned an average gross income greater than 200% (Institute 
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for Statistics of FB&H, 20118), so a measure with five intervals is sufficient. 
For the OECD countries, Paturot et al. (2013, p. 21) indicate an important 
conclusion regarding overall progressivity: even in countries with progressive 
PIT, since SSCs are levied at a flat rate, SSCs reduce overall progressivity. The 
indicators are the highest at the bottom income interval (50–67% of the AW 
for a single earner), and decrease with a rise of income. In OECD countries 
in 2011, the year when the indicator was calculated, the average PIT rate 
progression indicator (the highest indicator) amounted to 0.195 over 50-
67% of the average wage earnings interval, which means that the personal 
average tax rate increased with 0.195% points per 1% point increase in the 
AW over the 50–67% income level. The increase in the average PIT rate at 67% 
of the AW, compared to the rate at 50% of the AW, is then 0,195 multiplied by 
17% (the difference between 50% and 67% income interval) and equals 3.3 
(Paturot et al., 2013, p. 9).
Alternative measure of progressivity could be calculated using Musgrave and 
Thin (1948) methodology of marginal tax rates being greater than average 
tax rates. Since Musgrave and Thin (1948) define structural and effective 
progressivity indicators, we will focus on structural indicators using equation 
(1).
The average PIT rate progression indicators in Estonia and Slovakia are also 
low for a single earner at 50–67% of AW in 2011, and amount to 0.1 and 0.2 
respectively (Paturot et al., 2013, p. 32). Also, they have a falling tendency 
as the average income rises and are the lowest at the top income interval 
(167–200% of AW), and amount to 0.01 and 0.02 respectively (Paturot et al., 
2013, p. 12).
In the case of FB&H, due to flat tax at a low 10% rate as well as flat SSCs 
rates (levied at 31% and 10.5% rate and paid by the employee and employer 
respectively), the average PIT rate progression indicator for a single earner 
at two thirds of AW in 2011 is virtually zero (i.e., it amounts to 0.000005 and 
has a downward trend as average income rises to top income intervals). In 
the top interval (200% of AW), it amounts 0.0000004 (own calculation). In 
fact, progressivity indicators are insignificantly low at all levels of AW in FB&H. 
Hence, flat tax reform with standard allowances did not bring any significant 
progressivity since SSCs reforms did not follow suit – and SSCs take most of 
the average gross wage earnings and the corresponding tax wedge. So it is 
justified to say that progressivity indicators tend to equal zero, especially 
in those transition countries with “low levels of AW and flat taxes” (Paturot et 
al., 2013, p. 12). 
Even though it is not a progressivity measure, we have to bear in mind that 
total tax wedge (for a single earner without children at the income level 
of average worker) is significantly higher in FB&H that in Estonia, Slovakia 
8 Net wage earnings were converted to gross and calculated at the annual level rather than at 
the monthly level, although monthly versus annual makes no difference in the final outcome.
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or RS (OECD, 2014b, p. 16; Kreso & Lazovic-Pita, 2011). So, (F)B&H needs to 
undertake serious reforms in both PIT and SSCs policy if it aims to make the 
PIT system more progressive (and equitable). In order to improve efficiency, 
FB&H should reform PIT system introducing a clear definition of the PIT tax 
base and perhaps reform SSCs system introducing a differentiated SSCs rates 
for different levels of average wages which would affect both efficiency and 
equity aspects.
4 Conclusion
We have determined that in developed countries since 1980s there has been 
a shift from equity to efficiency principle. The comprehensiveness of the tax 
base was firstly evaluated since efficiency was enhanced by base broadening 
measures. We came to a conclusion that PIT tax base is nowadays hybrid 
regardless of tax rates. We also investigated efficiency aspects of the flat tax 
by developing a theoretical benchmark model and comparing it in practice 
in selected transition countries. We conclude that very few characteristics of 
theoretical flat tax have been applied in practice. As an equity aspect of PIT, 
we also analysed the progressivity indicators. Progressivity indicators are very 
low in selected transition countries, which are a result of the flat PIT and flat 
SSCs. Finally, for the case of (F)B&H, efficiency and progressivity measures 
can be enhanced indicating that PIT reforms should be brought together with 
SSCs reforms which would be a unique reform solution. We could broaden 
our research to other non-standard deductions and allowances and other 
sources of income in all selected countries or even expand our research to all 
transition countries that apply the flat tax and compare it to the theoretical 
model.
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POVZETEK
1.02 Pregledni znanstveni članek
Ukrepi za doseganje učinkovite in progresivne 
enotne davčne stopnje s posebnim poudarkom na 
Bosni in Hercegovini
Ta članek se osredotoča na ukrepe za doseganje učinkovitega in progresivnega 
davka od dohodka fizičnih oseb (dohodnina) v izbranih tranzicijskih državah. 
Dohodnino se večinoma odmerja na osnovi treh davčnih načel s poudarkom 
na uravnilovki med učinkovitostjo in pravičnostjo.
Ta članek v prvi vrsti analizira splošne težnje pri obdavčitvi dohodnine v razvitih 
državah, ki so v zadnjih tridesetih letih dajale prednost načelu učinkovitosti 
pred načelom pravičnosti. Ta težnja se vrednoti po eni strani z zmanjšanjem 
celotne progresivnosti obdavčitve dohodkov fizičnih oseb v smislu zmanjšanja 
števila davčnih razredov in davčnih stopenj ter drugih osnovnih ukrepov na eni 
strani ter naraščajoče neenakosti na drugi strani. Poleg tega pa je bil prihodek 
v primerjavi s porabo kot davčno osnovo za izračun dohodnine analiziran zgolj 
na kratko, saj teoretični model enotne davčne stopnje spodbuja ukrepe za 
doseganje večje učinkovitosti. Kot drugič, se članek osredotoča na izbrano 
število tranzicijskih držav, ki pri obdavčitvi dohodkov fizičnih oseb uporabljajo 
ali so uporabljale enotno davčno stopnjo. V tem članku se učinkovitost meri 
v smislu davčne nevtralnosti. Za te namene je bil razvit teoretični referenčni 
model, namenjen za obdavčitev dohodkov fizičnih oseb. Ta model združuje 
teoretske koncepte učinkovite (ali davčno nevtralne) davčne osnove za odmero 
davka s teoretičnimi koncepti davčne osnove v skladu z enotno davčno stopnjo. 
Davčna osnova za odmero dohodnine, ki je opredeljena v takih okoliščinah, je 
široka in ima zelo redke olajšave, odbitke ali oprostitve. Teoretični referenčni 
model se je nato uporabil za primerjavo z uporabljenim modelom enotne 
davčne stopnje v Estoniji, na Slovaškem ter v Bosni in Hercegovini (BiH). 
Države so bile izbrane na podlagi njihovih izkušenj z enotno davčno stopnjo, in 
sicer v Estoniji se model enotne davčne stopnje uporablja od leta 1994 dalje, 
Slovaška pa je namesto progresivnega davka od dohodkov fizičnih oseb za 
deset let uvedla enotno davčno stopnjo, ki jo je leta 2013 ponovno spremenila 
v progresivni davek od dohodkov fizičnih oseb. Primerjava je bila narejena 
med prakso, ki je uveljavljena v dveh izbranih državah, in primerom prakse v 
BiH oz. Federaciji BiH. Zaradi predvsem nejasne opredelitve davčne osnove 
(tj. kombinacije dohodka in porabe, ki služi kot davčna osnova za odmero 
dohodnine) ugotovimo, da obstajajo odstopanja od teoretičnega modela 
v praksi, kar prispeva k njegovi neučinkovitosti. Izkrivljanja so posledica 
odstopanj v opredelitvi davčne osnove, in sicer v številnih dodatkih in odbitkih. 
Prišli smo do sklepa, da so razlike med teoretično in empirično opredelitvijo 
osebnega dohodka kot davčne osnove bolj pomembne kot pa izbira števila 
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davčnih stopenj v smislu razprave o progresivni davčni stopnji v primerjavi z 
enotno davčno stopnjo.
Tretjič, analizirali smo še en pomemben vidik enotne davčne stopnje, in 
sicer pomanjkanje progresivnosti, kar vpliva na vidik pravičnosti. Kazalniki 
progresivnosti predstavljajo ukrepe, ki so močno obremenjeni s prispevki za 
socialno varnost (PSV-ji). Enotna davčna stopnja v teoriji PSV-jev ne analizira, 
vendar so zelo pomembni pri analizi uravnilovke za doseganje učinkovitosti in 
pravičnosti. PSV-ji so v večini držav OECD obračunavajo po pavšalnih stopnjah, 
torej po merilu strukturnih kazalnikov progresivnosti, pri katerih se upošteva 
povprečno plačo, PSV-ji znižujejo splošno progresivnost. V izbranih tranzicijskih 
državah so kazalniki progresivnosti zelo nizki, kar je posledica enotne davčne 
stopnje in pavšalnih PSV-jev. V Estoniji in na Slovaškem je kazalnik povprečne 
progresivne davčne stopnje za obračun davka od dohodka fizičnih oseb pri 
enem zaposlenem nižji za dve tretjini povprečne plače kot v (razvitih) državah, 
ki uporabljajo progresivno obdavčitev.
Nenazadnje ta članek predstavi kratko analizo zapletene ustavne ureditve 
v BiH kot asimetrične (kon)federacije, ki se odraža tudi v davčnem sistemu 
BiH. BiH je organizirana kot država z dvema entitetama in enim okrožjem 
(Brčko), kjer vsaka entiteta izvaja svojo lastno politiko obdavčitve dohodka 
fizičnih oseb. Čeprav je bila v Federaciji BiH leta 2009 uvedena enotna davčna 
stopnja, je davčna osnova za določitev davka od dohodka fizičnih oseb v 
Republiki srbski (RS) zaradi njenih številnih zakonskih sprememb nejasno 
opredeljena. Proces tranzicije poteka v BiH zelo počasi in davčne reforme, ki 
so bile izvedene, se večinoma izvajajo pod pritiskom ali na podlagi končnih 
odločitev mednarodne skupnosti v BiH. Reforme PSV-jev, ki predstavljajo 
ostanke iz prejšnjega davčnega sistema, se v obeh entitetah še niso začele 
izvajati. V primeru Federacije BiH smo lahko videli, da v Federaciji BiH zaradi 
pomanjkanja strukturnih reform na področju dohodnine in PSV-jev do 
progresivnosti ni prišlo (le-ta je dejansko enaka nič), za razliko od ostalih dveh 
izbranih tranzicijskih držav, ki uporabljata ali pa sta uporabili enotno davčno 
stopnjo. Ta ukrep izpostavlja pomembno dejstvo, da PSV-ji v veliki meri 
vplivajo na progresivnost, in s tem tudi na vidike pravičnosti pri obdavčevanju 
dohodka fizičnih oseb, in da je davek od dohodka fizičnih oseb treba analizirati 
skupaj s PSV-ji v smislu dohodninskih reform in uravnilovke med učinkovitostjo 
in pravičnostjo. V primeru Federacije BiH je mogoče povečati ukrepe za 
doseganje učinkovitosti in progresivnosti, ki kažejo, da je reformo davka od 
dohodka fizičnih oseb treba združiti z reformo PSV-jev, kar bi bila edinstvena 
reformna rešitev.
